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We present a multiperiod agency model of stock-based executive compensation in a speculative
stock market, where investors have heterogeneous beliefs and stock prices may deviate from underlying
fundamentals and include a speculative option component. This component arises from the option to
sell the stock in the future to potentially overoptimistic investors. We show that optimal compensation
contracts may emphasize short-term stock performance, at the expense of long-run fundamental value, as
an incentive to induce managers to pursue actions which increase the speculative component in the stock
price. Our model provides a different perspective on the recent corporate crisis than the “rent extraction
view” of executive compensation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Following the collapse of the recent technology bubble on NASDAQ and other exchanges, nu-
merous stories have appeared in the ﬁnancial press pointing out how executives and directors
of many companies managed to enrich themselves by selling their shares shortly before their
company’s stock price crumpled.1 These striking reports have raised concerns about executive
compensation and cast doubt on their intended incentive efﬁciency.
The classical view of executive compensation as formulated by Mirrlees (1975), Holmstrom
(1979), and more recently by Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) among others rests on two funda-
mental hypotheses. First, CEO incentive schemes efﬁciently trade off risk sharing and incentive
considerations, and second, stock prices are unbiased estimators of ﬁrm fundamentals on which
CEO pay could be based to reward managerial effort. While the recent corporate crisis has led
many commentators to entirely reject this classical view, our paper takes a different perspective.
We examine the implications for optimal incentive contracting of relaxing the second hypoth-
esis about stock markets and are thus able to reconcile the incentive perspective of executive
compensation with the recent events.
Speciﬁcally, in this paper, we depart from Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) by introducing a
source for difference of opinions among investors which, in turn, assures that stock prices reﬂect
not only the fundamental value of the ﬁrm but also a short-term speculative component. In addi-
tion, we postulate that risk-averse managers can take speciﬁc actions that boost the speculative
1. The Financial Times has conducted a survey of the 25 largest ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms since January 2001
and found that, although hundreds of billions of investor wealth together with 100,000 jobs disappeared, top executives
and directors in these ﬁrms walked away with a total of $3·3 billion by selling their stock holdings early (see Financial
Times, 31 July 2002).
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component in stock prices, albeit at the expense of long-run fundamental value. We solve this
modiﬁed principal–agent problem and show that optimal compensation contracts will overem-
phasize short-term stock performance to induce managers to take actions that may increase the
speculative component in stock prices. We also consider the role of controlling shareholders who
have a longer-term outlook and argue that although they do not beneﬁt directly from stock sales
at the inﬂated short-run prices, they may still encourage some short-termist strategies to reduce
their cost of capital.
There is growing evidence that stock prices can deviate from fundamental values for
prolonged periods of time.2 While many economists believe in the long-run efﬁciency of stock
markets, they also recognize that U.S. stock markets have displayed an important speculative
component during the period between 1998 and 2000.3 In addition, several recent studies have
shown that it is difﬁcult to reconcile the stock price levels and volatility of many Internet and
high-tech ﬁrms during this period with standard discounted cash ﬂow valuations.4 In some highly
publicized cases, the market value of a parent company was even less than the value of its hold-
ings in an “Internet” subsidiary. The trading volume for these stocks was also much higher than
that for more traditional companies, a likely indicator of differences of opinion among investors
regarding the fundamental values of these stocks.5
The general idea we build on in this paper, that stock prices may be higher than fundamental
value when there are differences of opinion and short-sales constraints, actually has a long an-
cestry in economics and ﬁnance. It has been traced back to early writings by Keynes (1936) and
later resurfaced in the articles by Miller (1977), Harrison and Kreps (1978) and more recently
Morris (1996), Chen, Hong and Stein (2002), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).
Several questions arise concerning the use of stocks in CEO compensation contracts when
stock prices may not always reﬂect the fundamental value of the ﬁrm. For example, what kind of
incentive would stock compensation provide to ﬁrm managers in such an environment? Would
investors be willing to use stocks for compensating managers if they knew that stock prices could
deviate substantially from fundamental value? More generally, what is “shareholder value” in
such a speculative market? Our goal in this paper is to set up a tractable theoretical model to
address these questions and to provide an analysis of optimal CEO compensation in speculative
markets.
We consider an optimal contracting problem in a two-period principal–agent model similar
to that of Holmstrom and Tirole (1993). We let a risk-averse CEO choose some costly hidden
actions, which affect both the long-run fundamental value of the ﬁrm (in period 2) and its short-
run stock valuation (in period 1). For risk-diversiﬁcation reasons, when the stock price is an
unbiased estimate of the fundamental value of the ﬁrm, the optimal (linear) CEO compensation
scheme has both a short-run and a long-run stock participation component.
Our ﬁrst departure from Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) is the introduction of a “specula-
tive stock market”. Speciﬁcally, we build on the model of equilibrium stock-price dynamics in
the presence of “overconﬁdent” investors by Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).6 In this model,
overconﬁdence provides a source of heterogeneous beliefs among investors, which lead them to
speculate against each other. The holder of a share then has not only a claim to future dividends
but also an option to sell the stock to a more optimistic investor in the future. Stock prices in this
2. See Shiller (2000) and Shleifer (2000) for supporting arguments and Fama (1998) for a contrarian view.
3. For example, Malkiel (2003).
4. See Cochrane (2002), Lamont and Thaler (2003), and Ofek and Richardson (2003).
5. An extreme example is the trading volume in Palm stock, which turned over once every day according to
Lamont and Thaler (2003, table 8).
6. Overconﬁdence is a frequently observed behavioural bias in psychological studies. See Daniel, Hirshleifer and
Teoh (2002) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) for reviews of the related psychological studies and the applications of
overconﬁdence in economics and ﬁnance.
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model have two components: a long-run fundamental and a short-term speculative component.
Investors are willing to pay more than what they believe to be the stock’s long-run fundamental
value because they think they may be able to sell their shares in the short term to other investors
with more optimistic beliefs.7
Our second departure from Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) is the introduction of a multi-
task problem for the CEO, similar to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1992). That is, we allow the
CEO to divide his/her time between increasing the long-term value of the ﬁrm and encouraging
speculation in the stock in the short term by pursuing projects over which investors are likely to
have diverging beliefs. In times of great heterogeneity in investor beliefs, the optimal incentive
contract is designed to partially or completely induce the CEO to pursue the strategy that tends
to exacerbate investors’ differences of opinion and to bring about a higher speculative option
value. Importantly, both initial shareholders and the CEO can gain from this strategy since it may
increase the stock price in the short run.8 Thus, CEOs may be encouraged to pursue short-term
speculative projects even at the expense of long-term fundamental value.
Although short-termist behaviour by managers has been highlighted before (most notably,
Stein, 1988, 1989; Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Von Thadden, 1995), managerial short-termism in
these models is not induced by some optimal incentive scheme, but rather due to information
or other forms of imperfection, and it arises against the wishes of shareholders. In contrast,
the managerial short-termism analysed in our paper is consistent with the speculative motive
of incumbent shareholders and therefore would not be eliminated even with active shareholder
intervention. More closely related to our paper is that of Froot, Perold and Stein (1992), who
provideadiscussionofthepotentiallinkbetweentheshort-termhorizonofshareholderandshort-
term managerial behaviour. They point out that the effective horizon of institutional investors,
as measured by the frequency of their share turnover, is about 1 year, much shorter than the
necessary period for them to exert long-term discipline on ﬁrm managers. However, their paper
does not provide a formal model or analysis of optimal incentive compensation in an environment
in which controlling shareholders have a short-term objective.9
Our model, thus, provides a way of reconciling the agency perspective on stock compen-
sation with the recent corporate crisis. We can explain why it is optimal for shareholders to
offer compensation contracts under which CEOs can make early gains from a speculative stock
price upswing, even though at a later date the ﬁrm’s market value may collapse. We also pro-
vide a rationalization for the observed increase in stock-based compensation during speculative
phases. Our theory of executive compensation in speculative markets, therefore, gives an alterna-
tive explanation for the recent corporate crisis than the increasingly inﬂuential view emphasizing
managerial power and abuse brought about by a lack of adequate board supervision (see Bertrand
and Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002).10
Rent-seeking behaviour by managers is always present, but the existing rent-seeking theo-
ries fail to explain why rent-seeking behaviour would have trended upwards over the 1990s even
7. In a thought-provoking account of the Internet bubble, Lewis (2002) has given a vivid description of the thought
process of many investors, when he explained the reasoning behind his purchase of the Internet company stock Exodus
Communications at the end of 1999: “I ﬁgured that even if Exodus Communications didn’t wind up being a big success,
enough people would believe in the thing to drive the stock price even higher and allow me to get out with a quick proﬁt”
(Lewis, 2002).
8. In some cases, these initial shareholders are venture capitalists (VCs), who typically structure the manager’s
contracts in new ﬁrms.
9. Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2003) provide another study of the ﬁnancial contracting problem in the presence
of behavioural biases. They show that rational investors can hire modestly overconﬁdent and optimistic managers to mit-
igate the agency problem. Our study emphasizes that speculative motive by investors can cause short-termist managerial
behaviour through an optimal contract.
10. Murphy (2002) and Jensen and Murphy (2004) propose instead that compensation committees have underesti-
mated the cost of issuing stocks and options to managers.
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though corporate governance was generally strengthened over this period. In contrast, our model
suggests a link between short-termist behaviour and differences of opinion as measured by share
turnover. High turnover is likely to be observed in ﬁrms in new industries, where it is usually
more difﬁcult to evaluate fundamentals and therefore easier for disagreement among potential
investors to arise.
An implication of our analysis is that a failure to maximize long-run ﬁrm value is not nec-
essarily a symptom of weak corporate governance, but may be a reﬂection of a more short-term,
speculative orientation of shareholders. Thus, if the goal is to ensure the maximization of long-
run fundamental value, then one may want to not only strengthen corporate governance but also
lengthen stock-option vesting periods, lengthen director terms, insulate the board of directors
more from market swings, and more generally take steps ensuring that controlling shareholders
(or the board of directors) have a longer-term outlook. Indeed, we show that the more long-term
oriented shareholders are, the less likely they are to encourage the CEO to engage in short-termist
behaviour. Having said this, however, we also show that even long-term-oriented shareholders
may want to pursue short-termist strategies in particularly speculative stock market environments
as a way of reducing the ﬁrm’s cost of capital.
Our model provides a mechanism for investors’ speculative motive to drive ﬁrms’ overin-
vestment, as many argued for the investment boom in the telecom industry in the late 1990s.
Thus, our study echoes the growing literature on the effects of inefﬁcient stock markets on ﬁrms’
investment decisions. For example, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Blanchard, Rhee and
Summers (1993), Stein (1996), Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003), Polk and Sapienza (2003),
Panageas (2004) and Gilchrist, Himmelberg and Huberman (2005) have emphasized that when
stocks are overvalued, ﬁrms overinvest by taking advantage of a cheap source of capital. As in
our model, a link is thus established between equity overvaluation and ﬁrm behaviour. However,
unlike our paper, this literature does not explain why ﬁrms run by managers on behalf of their
investors would engage in inefﬁcient investment behaviour that is detrimental to their investors’
interests.11
In independent work from ours, Jensen (2004) and Jensen and Murphy (2004) have also
pointed to what they refer to as the agency costs of overvalued equity as the main cause of the
recent corporate crisis. They argue that when managers have large holdings of stock or options,
they have strong incentives to engage in long-term, value-destroying actions to boost or main-
tain stock price at inﬂated levels in the short run. Again, their view lacks a coherent theoretical
framework to pit against the efﬁcient markets paradigm. In particular, they do not explain how
stock overvaluation arises and how value-destroying managerial actions can temporarily sustain
overvalued equity. Our theoretical framework addresses these weaknesses and highlights how
both the notions of overvalued equity and the conﬂict between short-term and long-term value
emerge from differences of opinions among shareholders coupled with short-sales constraints.
There is by now a whole body of evidence consistent with at least the weak form of our
theory, which shows how for a ﬁxed executive compensation contract, CEO orientation be-
comes more short-termist in speculative markets (Proposition 4). In particular, there is grow-
ing evidence that CEOs have engaged in more value-destroying activities to boost short-term
stock price performance, in periods when differences of opinion among investors were more
pronounced. We discuss this evidence more systematically in Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong
(2004). It is worth mentioning here one prevalent form of value-destroying activity that has risen
11. Another related literature deals with the incentive effects of early “exit” by managers or large shareholders (e.g.
Bolton and von Thadden, 1998; Kahn and Winton, 1998; Maug, 1998; Aghion, Bolton and Tirole, 2000). However, this
literature assumes that stock markets are efﬁcient. More recently, Bebchuk and Bar-Gill (2003) have analysed the cost
of permitting better informed managers to sell shares early, but they do not study the optimal compensation scheme that
would be chosen by shareholders in their framework.
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withstock-option-basedcompensationthroughoutthetechnologybubble: earningsmanipulation,
either in the form of accounting manipulation (see Peng and Roell, 2003) or in the form of
wasteful actions, such as inefﬁcient mergers or delayed investment and R&D expenditure (see
Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005).
One test of the strong form of our theory, which assumes that the contracting parties op-
timally adapt the compensation contract to market conditions, would be whether the short-term
performance weighting in CEO compensation increases with high levels of speculation, as, say,
measured by secondary-market trading. This greater short-term weighting may be characterized
by shorter vesting periods or shorter CEO tenure, for example. Precise measures of these vari-
ables may be difﬁcult to construct, and we are not aware of any study that has attempted to
do this.
Interestingly, some policy implications emerging from our analysis echo the arguments sup-
porting the protection of target ﬁrms against hostile takeovers by Lipton (1987) and other legal
scholars. The central issue in the policy debate on hostile takeovers in the 1980s was whether
stock market valuations accurately reﬂected ﬁrms’ fundamental value. Most legal scholars and
economists were arguing that market values were the best available measure of a ﬁrm’s long-term
value and that any value-increasing takeover, as measured by short-term stock price movements,
should go forward. The contrarian view was that many hostile takeovers were purely speculative
transactions seeking to realize a quick proﬁt by breaking up undervalued ﬁrms in spite of the loss
of long-run efﬁciency that resulted from splitting up the ﬁrm. This view has been ﬁghting an up-
hill battle because it lacked a coherent theory of asset pricing in speculative markets. A variation
of our model, however, can be the basis of a theoretical framework for this view.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 derives the optimal
CEO compensation contract under the classical assumption that stock markets are efﬁcient. In
Section 4, we introduce investors with heterogeneous beliefs and characterize the optimal con-
tract in the presence of a speculative market. Section 5 analyses whether a long-term-oriented
board can remedy the short-termism generated by a speculative stock market. In Section 6, we
discuss some implications from our model. Section 7 concludes the paper. An appendix contains
most proofs and numerical illustrations of some comparative statics.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a publicly traded ﬁrm run by a risk-averse CEO. There are three dates: t = 0,1,2.
The ﬁrm is liquidated at t = 2. At t = 0, the manager can spend time or effort between two
projects: a project with a higher long-term expected return and a project with an inferior long-
run expected return but which is more likely to be overvalued by some future investors in the
secondary market.12 For simplicity, we set the interest rate to zero. We also assume that share-
holders and potential investors are risk neutral, while the CEO is risk averse.13
The ﬁrm’s long-term value at t = 2, thus, has three additive components:
e = u+v +ε,
where
• u represents the realized value of the ﬁrst project. It is a normally distributed random vari-
able with mean hµ and variance σ2 (or precision τ = 1/σ2). Here, µ ≥ 0 denotes the
12. Examples of this type of project can be “making an acquisition or spending a fortune on an Internet venture to
satisfy the whims of an irrational market” (see Jensen, 2004).
13. The standard justiﬁcation for shareholders’ risk neutrality is that they can diversify ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, while the
CEO cannot.
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CEO’s hidden “effort”, and h > 0 is a parameter measuring the expected return of effort.
The variance σ2 is outside the manager’s control.
• v is the terminal value of the inferior project, which we refer to as a “castle-in-the-air”
venture. It is also a normally distributed random variable. To be able to deﬁne a simple
benchmark under an efﬁcient stock market with no speculative trading, we assume that the
unit return on this project, which we denote by z, has a ﬁxed mean which we normalize to
zero. The unit variance of this project is l2. This project can be scaled up by the CEO by
raising the observable level of managerial time ω devoted to the project. Then, for a given
choice of ω, the total variance of the project is ω2l2.
In summary, the castle-in-the-air venture is a “constant return to scale” project with an
inferior long-term mean return. The attraction of this project, however, is that it might
become overvalued by some investors in a speculative market. We will show that in an
efﬁcient stock market, optimal compensation design would lead the CEO to spend no time
on this project. However, this will not be the case in a speculative stock market.
• ε is a pure noise term; it is a normally distributed random variable with mean of zero and
variance σ2
ε (or precision τε = 1/σ2
ε ).
If we let the random variable W denote the ﬁnancial stake of the CEO in the ﬁrm, then the
CEO’s pay-off is represented by the usual additively separable utility function:
E0u(W)−ψ(µ,ω),






We make the additional simplifying assumption that the CEO’s attitudes towards risk can be





where γ>0 measures the CEO’s aversion to risk.
Intuitively, one can think of µ and ω as time spent on the two separate projects. Under this
formulation, the two activities are substitutes and there are diminishing returns to spending more
time on each task.
At t = 1, two signals are publicly observed by all investors. Signal s provides information
about u (the value of the ﬁrm’s fundamental project) and signal θ about z (the per unit return of
the castle-in-the-air project). We assume that
s = u+εs
θ = z+εθ,
whereεs and εθ are again normally distributed random variables with mean of zero and respective
variances σ2
s and σ2
θ (or precisions τs =1/σ2
s and τθ =1/σ2




where η is a constant measuring the informativeness of signal θ. The two signals allow investors
to revise their beliefs about the long-term value of the ﬁrm.
After observing the signals, investors can trade the ﬁrm’s stocks, in a competitive market, at
t =1. The determination of investors’ beliefs and the resulting equilibrium price in the secondary
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market p1 are a central part of our analysis. We normalize the initial number of shares held by
investors to one.
The central problem for shareholders at t = 0 is to design a CEO compensation package to
motivate the CEO to allocate his/her time optimally between the two tasks and between “work”
and “leisure”, without exposing him/her to too much risk. As is standard in the theoretical lit-
erature on executive compensation, we will only consider linear compensation contracts.14 Our
compensation contracts specify both a short-term and a long-term equity stake for the manager
and take the form:15
W = ap1+be+c, (1)
where:
• p1 represents the ﬁrm’s stock value at t = 1.
• a denotes the short-run weighting of the CEO’s compensation (the fraction of non-vested
CEO shares).
• b is the long-run weighting (the fraction of CEO share ownership that is tied up until t =2).
• c is the non-performance-based compensation component.
The initial shareholders’ problem is then to choose the contract {a,b,c} (through the board
of directors, or the compensation committee) to maximize the ﬁrm’s stock price at t = 0, subject
to satisfying the manager’s participation and incentive constraints. Formally, the initial share-












(µ+ω)2 ≥ ¯ W,
where ¯ W is the manager’s reservation utility.16
The timing of events is as follows. At t = 0, initial shareholders determine the managerial
contract {a,b,c}. Then, the manager chooses his/her actions µ and ω.A tt = 1, market partici-
pants trade stocks based on the realized signals s and θ and the observed value of ω.A tt = 2,
the ﬁrm is liquidated and the ﬁnal value e is divided among shareholders after deducting the
CEO’s pay.
3. OPTIMAL EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN AN EFFICIENT MARKET
To set a benchmark, we begin by solving for the optimal CEO compensation contract under the
assumption that all investors share the same correct belief. This section mostly builds on and
adapts the analysis of Holmstrom and Tirole (1993). In an efﬁcient market, the stock price p1
incorporates all the information contained in the short-term signals s and θ that investors observe.
14. A few recent attempts have been made to explore more general non-linear (option like) contracts (see, e.g.
Huang and Suarez, 1997; Hemmer, Kim and Verrecchia, 2000).
15. An implicit assumption in our linear speciﬁcation of the CEO compensation package is that shareholders do not
write forcing contracts on the CEO’s observable level of managerial activity devoted to the castle-in-the-air project. This
is a realistic simpliﬁcation as in reality a castle-in-the-air project may well involve many dimensions which are difﬁcult
to describe accurately and exhaustively in a contract.
16. Sometimes this formulation is misinterpreted as meaning that shareholders have all the bargaining power
(a patently counterfactual assumption) and can force the CEO down to his/her reservation utility level. But the solution












subject to p0 ≥ p0,
would be the same up to a constant. In the standard agency problem, the bargaining power of the manager determines the
level of his/her total compensation (c), but not the structure of the compensation package (a and b).
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Since, however, s and θ are noisy signals of u and z, the short-term stock price p1 cannot be a
sufﬁcient statistic for the manager’s effort choice µ and ω. Therefore, since the CEO is risk
averse, one should expect his/her compensation package to have both short-run and long-run
components.
3.1. Informationally efﬁcient stock markets
More formally, if all the market participants are fully rational, equilibrium stock prices at t = 0
and t = 1 are given by:
p0 = E0(p1) and p1 = E(e−W | s,θ,ω),
where W is the compensation to the manager.
The manager’s effort choice µ in the fundamental project is not observable. However, in
a rational expectations equilibrium, shareholders correctly expect the manager to choose the
optimal effort µ∗ under the CEO compensation contract and form the following conditional
expectations:















Equation (2) is the standard expression for the conditional expectation given that u,s,v, and
θ are normally distributed random variables with respective precisions τ,τs,τz, and τθ (see, e.g.
DeGroot, 1970). Equation (3) follows immediately upon substitution of τz/τθ =η and s =u+εs.
The equilibrium stock price at t = 1 is deﬁned by the following equation:
p1 = E(e−W | s,θ,ω)= E[e−(ap1+be+c) | s,θ,ω].
















represent the residual stock value net of the manager’s stake.
Substituting this expression for the equilibrium price p1 into equation (1) deﬁning the man-
ager’s compensation, we obtain
W = αE(e | s,θ,ω)+βe+δ,








Thus, α denotes the percentage ownership in the ﬁrm that the manager is allowed to sell in
the ﬁrst period; β,the percentage ownership in the ﬁrm that the manager must hold until the end;
and δ, the manager’s non-performance-based compensation.
In practice, CEO compensation packages typically satisfy 0 ≤ β<1 and 0 <α<1−β.
That is, CEOs are not allowed to short the stock of their company and CEOs do not hold the
entire equity of the ﬁrm. Accordingly, we shall restrict attention to contracts such that α ≥ 0,
β ≥ 0, and α+β ≤ 1.
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3.2. The manager’s optimization problem










where E0() and Var0() are unconditional expectation and variance of the manager at t = 0.
It is immediately apparent from this objective that it is optimal for the manager to set ω = 0
under any contract {α,β,δ}. This is to be expected. Since spending effort ω on the castle-in-
the-air project does not affect the equilibrium stock price in an informationally efﬁcient market,
it never pays to set ω>0. A higher ω only increases the variance of the manager’s pay-off and
involves a higher effort cost. Thus, in an informationally efﬁcient stock market, the CEO would
not engage in any short-termist behaviour.17
Setting ω = 0 and substituting for the expression for E(e | s,θ)in equation (3), the CEO’s
























constant would give the same incentive to choose µ. Note also that since the
stock price p1 is built on noisy information about the fundamental value of the ﬁrm u, the incen-
tive effect of the short-term stock participation α is dampened to τs
τ+τs α.
Next, substituting for ω and µ∗ in (3), we obtain the unconditional expected ﬁrm value
at t = 0:
E0[e] = E0[E(e | s,θ)] = hµ∗,
where µ∗ is the effort choice of the CEO, as given in equation (5).








Var0[αE(e | s,θ)+βe] = ¯ W, (6)
where

























17. This result contrasts with those of Stein (1989) and Von Thadden (1995), where short-termist behaviour can
take place in an efﬁcient stock market for “signal jamming” reasons.
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3.3. The shareholder’s optimization problem




































would give the same incentives to




























Thus, we can ﬁrst solve for the optimal α and β for any given level of µ and then solve for
the optimal level of µ.
The optimal incentive contract we obtain in this way is described by the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. When the manager is sufﬁciently risk averse that γ> h2τ2
τ+τs+τε, the optimal































When the manager is not too averse to risk, so that γ ≤ h2τ2
τ+τs+τε, the optimal level of effort is
given by
µ =
h3τ2τε +hγτ s(τ +τs +τε)
h2τ2τε +γ(τ+τs +τε)(τ +τs)









For both cases, the cash component δ† is chosen so that the manager’s participation constraint
in equation (6) is binding.
Proof. See Appendix A.  
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In the case where the manager is not very risk averse, the constraint α +β ≤ 1 is binding
because the manager has a high risk tolerance. Indeed, as one would expect in this case, it is
optimal to effectively “sell the ﬁrm” to the manager and let him/her take on all the risk. This
solution involves only a small insurance cost but provides maximal effort incentives. Note, how-
ever, the difference in the optimal contract relative to the standard result that the ﬁrm should be
sold entirely to the manager when he/she is risk neutral. Here, when the manager is close to being
risk neutral, it may be optimal to have him/her “own” the entire ﬁrm at time zero. However, for
diversiﬁcation reasons, the manager will want to sell part of his/her holdings at time t = 1. When
the manager’s risk tolerance is low, on the other hand, it is optimal to set α+β<1 and to choose
α and β to minimize the manager’s insurance costs.
4. OPTIMAL CEO COMPENSATION IN A SPECULATIVE MARKET
A critical assumption in existing models of executive compensation is that stock markets are
informationally efﬁcient and that stock prices reﬂect the expected fundamental value of the ﬁrm.
If stock prices reﬂect fundamental value and if the CEO’s actions affect the ﬁrm’s long-run
fundamental value, then it seems quite sensible to incentivize the CEO through some form
of equity-based compensation. But how should CEOs be compensated when stock prices can
systematically deviate from fundamental value? This is the question we now address. To be able
to analyse this problem, however, we need a model of equilibrium stock prices which system-
atically depart from fundamentals. We will use a simpliﬁed version of Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003).18
More speciﬁcally, their model of speculative secondary stock markets involves trading
between overconﬁdent investors, who may disagree about the value of the ﬁrm. The introduc-
tion of investors with heterogeneous beliefs is the only change we bring to the classical model of
the previous section. All investors are still assumed to be risk neutral, but now they differ in their
estimates of the informativeness of the signal θ, which in turn leads to differences in their beliefs
at t = 1 about the ﬁrm’s terminal value, even if all investors start with the same prior beliefs
at t = 0. If θ>0 (θ < 0), investors who overestimate the precision of θ will buy (sell) shares
from other investors who are either rational or less overconﬁdent with respect to that signal.
Thus, this difference in beliefs generates secondary-market trading, and, due to the constraint on
short-selling all investors face, this also gives rise to a speculative price premium.
In short, differences of opinion combined with limits on short-selling give rise to equilib-
rium prices that may deviate from the ﬁrm’s fundamentals at t = 1. Since these deviations are
anticipated at t = 0 and priced in by initial shareholders, they also give rise to deviations from
fundamental value at t = 0. In other words, stock prices at t = 0 will reﬂect both the fundamental
value of the ﬁrm and a speculative component. Critically, for our purposes, the size of this spec-
ulative component can be inﬂuenced by inducing the manager to devote more effort to the castle-
in-the-air project, which is the main source of potential disagreement among investors at t = 1.
A particularly telling example of such a castle-in-the-air project is Enron’s venture into
broadband video on demand. This venture, along with the partnership with Blockbuster video,
was valued at several billion dollars, while Enron was still perceived as a model company: ac-
cording to the New York Times (17 January 2002) “The start of the broadband division helped
send the stock leaping still further from $40 in January [2001] to $90 several months later, when
18. There are a number of other behavioural models of stock markets, such as those of De Long, Shleifer, Summers
and Waldmann (1990), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Hong
and Stein (1999) that we could have used. We have opted for the approach of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) because
they explicitly model the non-fundamental component in prices and the endogenous short-term horizon of investors as
resulting from speculative trading by overconﬁdent investors.
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Enron announced a 20-year partnership with Blockbuster Entertainment to provide video-on-
demand services for consumers and subsequently announced a high-speed Internet deal with the
Microsoft Network”. In addition, the same New York Times article mentions that a spokesman for
the company said that Enron hoped to capitalize on the dot-com frenzy for online entertainment
stocks, “at the time, people were actually raising capital on weird concepts”.19
4.1. Equilibrium asset prices in a speculative market
To model speculative trading, we assume that there are two groups of investors: A and B. Each
group starts with the same prior beliefs but may end up with different posterior beliefs due to
disagreements on the informativeness of signal θ. Speciﬁcally, we assume that group-A investors
treat the precision of the signal as φAτθ, and group-B investors treat it as φBτθ. Under this
formalization, if φA → 1 and φB → 1, we are back in the case of efﬁcient markets with homo-
geneous beliefs. What is crucial for our analysis is the difference between φA and φB, which we
assume each group is fully aware of. This disagreement is consistent with the notion of overconﬁ-
dence that several recent ﬁnance models have built on to explain investor overreaction and exces-
sive trading.20 For the sake of consistency with this overconﬁdence interpretation, we shall also
assume that φA > 1 and/or φB > 1.
To simplify the contracting problem at t = 0, we shall assume that all controlling share-
holders and the CEO are of the same group, say, group A, and group-B investors buy into the
ﬁrm only at t = 1. This assumption allows us to avoid the spurious issue of aggregation of
shareholder objectives with different forms of heterogeneous beliefs. But also, it allows us to
avoid modelling explicitly another possible round of trading of shares between A investors and B
investors at t = 0. In effect, we are looking at the ﬁrm at t = 0, as if it had already gone through
an initial round of trading, which resulted in the group which values the ﬁrm the most holding
all the stock.21
For simplicity, we conﬁne investors’ disagreement to just the precision of signal θ. Investors
make the same observation of the scale of the castle-in-the-air project ω and use the correct
precision for signal s. Thus, in accordance with Bayes rule, investors in groups A and B share
the same posterior belief about u at t = 1:




In the remainder of this paper, we shall use superscripts A and B to denote the variables associ-
ated with the respective groups of investors.
At t = 1, the investors’ posteriors on v differ as follows:












19. Interestingly, even though Enron is now mainly remembered as a case of ﬂagrant fraud, it clearly is also an
example of a ﬁrm aggressively playing into the stock market bubble.
20. See, for example, Daniel et al. (1998), Odean (1998), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).
21. The assumption that the CEO and shareholders belong to the same group is purely for technical convenience.
Our main results would still hold if, say, the CEO belongs to a third group. However, under such an assumption, additional
considerations arise at t =0 if, say, a more optimistic CEO contracts with more sceptical shareholders. In such a situation,
it is likely that the optimal incentive scheme would be even more short-term oriented, as shareholders may then beneﬁt
from rewarding the CEO with what in their eyes is overvalued stock.
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Thus, the difference in posterior beliefs is








This difference in investors’ beliefs induces stock trading at t = 1: A-investors sell their
shares to B-investors when they have higher posteriors, and vice versa. Under risk-neutral pref-
erences, one would then expect to see unbounded bets between investors with heterogeneous
beliefs. We rule out such bets by assuming that investors cannot engage in short-selling. This is
a reasonable assumption as, in practice, it is usually difﬁcult and costly to sell stocks short.22
When stock selling is limited by short-sales constraints, the price of a stock will be driven
up to the valuation of the most optimistic investor. The short-sales constraints prevent rational
arbitrageurs from eliminating the upward-biased price set by optimistic investors. In practice,
there are many other constraints that restrict arbitrage trading even in absence of explicit short-
sales constraints (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Initial shareholders and the CEO (in group A)
thus have an option to sell their shares at t = 1 to investors in group B when these investors have
higher valuations.
Under these assumptions, we are able to derive the following simple expressions for the
expected value of the ﬁrm at t = 1 and t = 0. For a given action choice (µ,ω), the equilibrium
value of the ﬁrm at t = 1 to group-A investors is




(s−hµ)+ˆ v A +max(ˆ vB −ˆ v A,0),
and the expectation of V1 at t = 0i s
V0 = EA
0 [V1] = hµ+EA
0 [max(ˆ vB −ˆ v A,0)].
That is, the value of the ﬁrm at t = 0 now also includes the value of the option to sell to group-B
investors, EA
0 [max(ˆ vB −ˆ v A,0)].
This option is analogous to a standard ﬁnancial option, except that its underlying asset is
now the difference in beliefs: ˆ vB −ˆ v A. From equation (10), we note that (ˆ vB −ˆ v A) has a normal















Now, observe that the expected value of an option, max(0,y), for a random variable y with
Gaussian distribution y ∼ N(0,σ2














We have thus established that the value of the ﬁrm at t = 0 satisﬁes:
22. What is important for our analysis is that there are some limits on short sales. Setting these limits to zero is
a technical convenience. Several empirical studies, for example, D’Avolio (2002), Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002), and
Jones and Lamont (2002), have documented that it is costly to short sell stocks, especially for overvalued tech stocks
in the recent “bubble” period.
23. Recall that θ = z+εθ, where z and εθ are normally distributed random variables with mean zero and respective
variances l2 and ηl2. But, group-A investors overestimate the precision of θ themselves and believe that εθ only has
a variance of ηl2/φA
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Proposition 2. The equilibrium value of the ﬁrm at t = 0, given the effort vector
(µ,ω),i s




















Thus, a critical difference with the value under efﬁcient markets considered before is that
now the stock price at t = 0 is also an increasing function of ω, while before the gross stock
valuation was independent of ω. Notice that in the limit, when φA −φB is approaching zero,
the stock price is independent of ω, as before. In other words, in the presence of heterogeneous
beliefs among investors, the value of the castle-in-the-air project to initial shareholders increases
because of the option to sell to group-B shareholders at t = 1.24 The parameter K measures the
extent to which investors’ beliefs might differ at t = 1, and can be referred to as the speculative
coefﬁcient. As can be seen from Proposition 2, this coefﬁcient K is affected both by the difference
in φA and φB and by the informativeness of the signal.
This change in the valuation of the ﬁrm at t = 0 is the key distortion introduced by specula-
tive markets. As we shall illustrate below, this systematic bias in stock prices, far from discour-
aging rational shareholders from exposing the CEO to stock-based remuneration, will instead
induce them to put more weight on short-run stock performance. Indeed, incumbent shareholders
would now be willing to sacriﬁce some long-term value in µ for a higher ω in order to exploit
short-term speculative proﬁts.
4.2. The CEO’s problem





















p1 = (1−α−β)(ˆ u+max{ˆ v A, ˆ vB})−δ (14)
and
p0 = (1−α−β)EA
0 [ˆ u+max{ˆ v A, ˆ vB}]−δ. (15)











0 [α(ˆ u+max{ˆ v A, ˆ vB})+βe]. (16)
24. Note that if investors also had disagreement on the precision of signal s, then the speculative option value
would be attached to the long-run venture u as well. Heterogeneous beliefs and speculative markets would then give rise
to another inefﬁciency: overinvestment in u.
25. As the CEO is risk averse, he/she will always sell all his/her non-vested shares at t = 1.
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Initial shareholders, thus, choose {α,β} to maximize the ﬁrm’s net expected value subject
to the manager’s incentive constraint in equation (16) and his/her participation constraint. Sub-
stituting for ˆ u, ˆ v A, and ˆ vB into equation (14), we obtain the following expression for equilibrium
















Next, by substituting for p1 in the manager’s compensation formula W = ap1 +be+c, we get
the following expression for the manager’s mean compensation and its variance.
Lemma 3. Given the manager’s effort choice (µ,ω) and the choice, µ∗, anticipated by






















































Proof. See Appendix A.  















It is easy to see from this formulation that the manager’s marginal return to increasing the
scale, ω, of the castle-in-the-air project is increasing in the coefﬁcient K. Moreover, K itself is












the difference in investors’ estimates of the signal precision. In other words, it is immediately
apparent from this expression that the return to scaling up the speculative project is increasing in
the heterogeneous beliefs among investors.
To see this more explicitly, we solve the manager’s optimization problem under an arbitrary
contract {α,β,δ} and obtain the following characterization:
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Proposition 4. Given a compensation contract {α,β,δ}, the manager’s best response is
described by the following three situations:
1) Fundamentalist:




















































1+γ l2 and µ = 0,






Proof. See Appendix A.  
Because he/she is averse to risk, the CEO faces a lower marginal cost of effort on µ than
on ω. More explicitly, his/her marginal cost of action µ is only (µ+ω), while marginal cost on ω
is [(µ+ω)+γ l2ω]. Therefore, it only pays the manager to engage in short-termist behaviour
(by raising ω above zero) if the marginal return on the castle-in-the-air project exceeds that of








A sufﬁcient condition for the manager not to engage in any castle-in-the-air activity is that
Kl < hτs
τs+τ , which holds when K or l is small, or when h is large. That is, when there is either
little speculative motive among investors or it is difﬁcult to scale up v, or it is easy to improve
fundamentals.
In contrast, in a speculative bubble, when K is large
 
say, Kl > hτs
τs+τ
 
, the CEO would
want to pursue such a short-termist strategy provided that his/her short-term stock holdings α is
sufﬁciently large relative to long-term holdings β.
In the extreme case when the marginal return on raising ω exceeds that of µ, even after
adjusting for the risk premium, the CEO would only pursue the castle-in-the-air project.
4.3. The shareholders’ problem
The general form of shareholders’ constrained optimization problem is the same as before. They
choose {α,β,δ} to maximize the market value of the ﬁrm at t = 0 subject to the manager’s
















Var(W)+δ ≥ ¯ W.
At the optimum, the individual rationality constraint is binding and we can substitute for δ to



























− ¯ W, (19)
where µ(α,β) and ω(α,β) satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions of the CEO’s optimization problem
described in Proposition 4.
Although the shareholders’ problem is conceptually identical to the previous one, it is more
involved technically. In particular, due to the non-linearity in the objective function, an analytical
solution for the optimal contract {α,β,δ} is not generally available. However, it is easy to see
that an optimal contract always exists. First, the feasible set of contracts {α,β} is bounded and
closed. Second, the objective in equation (19) is continuous over this set of contracts. Therefore,
standard considerations guarantee that:
Proposition 5. There always exists at least one optimal contract that maximizes the
objective of initial shareholders in the set α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0 and α+β ≤ 1.
We are only able to explicitly characterize the optimal contract in the special case where the
CEO is risk neutral. In this extreme case the optimal contract is as follows:
Proposition 6. When the manager is risk neutral (γ = 0), the optimal contract induces
either:
a) Purely speculative behaviour by the manager, when Kl > h. In that case the optimal contract
is such that α = 1 and β = 0, and the resulting managerial actions are µ = 0 and ω = Kl,or
b) fundamentalist behaviour, when Kl ≤ h. In that case the optimal contract is such that α = 0
and β = 1, and the resulting managerial actions are µ = h and ω = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.  
Thus, in accordance with standard agency theory, when the manager is risk neutral, it is
optimal to make him/her a “residual claimant” on the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow (see Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Interestingly, however, in our set-up with speculative capital markets, this is not the ﬁnal
word on the optimal contract. It remains to determine whether the manager should be encouraged
tohaveanextremespeculativeshort-termistperspectiveorafundamentalistlong-termone.When
investors have a high degree of potential heterogeneous beliefs so that the speculative option
value at t = 0 is high (Kl > h), then it is optimal to induce the manager to focus on the short-
term strategy by allowing him/her to sell all his/her shares at t = 1. In contrast, when investors
are likely to be relatively less speculative, so that Kl ≤ h, the manager will choose to focus on
the long-term fundamental value of the ﬁrm and will sell no shares at t = 1. Since the manager
owns the ﬁrm, the contract can be interpreted as a commitment device.
This special case with a risk-neutral CEO illustrates in a simple way one basic effect of
speculative trading generated by heterogeneous beliefs on the CEO incentive contract. However,
in this case, there is no real agency costs.
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4.4. Risk-averse CEO
Even though a complete characterization of the optimal contract when the manager is risk averse
is not available, it is possible to determine a sufﬁcient condition on the speculative coefﬁcient K
under which the manager engages in short-termist behaviour, ω  = 0. We give a sufﬁcient condi-
tion here for the special case where only group-B investors are overconﬁdent. The reason why we
focus on this case is to emphasize the observation that i) even under an incentive contract that is
optimal given an efﬁcient secondary market, the CEO may engage in short-termist behaviour
(by setting ω>0) when there is an episode of overconﬁdence giving rise to a bubble and
ii) when such an episode arises it may be in the interest of shareholders to reinforce the manager’s
incentives towards short-termism by weighing his/her stock compensation more heavily towards
short-term compensation.


















Note that if φB = 1, the optimal managerial contract is the one given in Proposition 1. Now,
consider the following question: given that the manager and the incumbent shareholders are fully
rational, how does the presence of less sophisticated traders (group-B investors) affect the ﬁrm
and the managerial contract? Although the ﬁrm could always choose to ignore these investors in
the market, Proposition 7 below provides a sufﬁcient condition on the speculative coefﬁcient K
under which shareholders optimally adopt a managerial contract that induces some short-termist
behaviour from the manager.
Proposition 7. Let (α†,β†,δ†) be a contract (as speciﬁed in Proposition 1) that is optimal







α† > hβ†, (20)
then the optimal managerial contract (α,β,δ) induces short-termist behaviour: ω>0.
Proof. See Appendix A.  
The contract (α†,β†,δ†) is the optimal contract in the absence of heterogeneous beliefs, and
the total beneﬁt that the CEO and the initial shareholders derive from this contract represents the
maximum if no short-termist behaviour is pursued. When the risk-averse CEO ﬁnds it optimal to
set ω>0 given the contract (α†,β†,δ†), then a fortiori initial shareholders should value ω>0
even more, as they are risk neutral. Thus, both the initial shareholders and the CEO are better off
with some short-termist behaviour in the presence of group-B investors.
A complete analytical characterization of the optimal contract is not available due to
complexity involved in the constrained optimization of both investors and managers. This is
not surprising, as simple comparative statics results in contracting problems with moral hazard
are usually not available. Instead, we provide a comprehensive set of numerical examples in
Appendix B to illustrate how the optimal contract and managerial actions vary with model para-
meters such as risk aversion of the CEO, the overconﬁdence level of group-B investors, returns on
long-term and short-term effort, and fundamental risk. Although the optimal contracting problem
in the presence of speculative markets does not yield simple and monotonic comparative statics
results, as apparent from the numerical solutions, the bottom line is clear that a compensation
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contract that motivates short-termist managerial behaviour will be used when the stock market
becomes sufﬁciently speculative. For a more modest level of market speculation, short-termist
behaviour will still arise in the equilibrium if the CEO is more risk tolerant, or when the expected
return to the ﬁrm’s long-term project is sufﬁciently low and the uncertainty is high.
5. DOES A LONG-TERM-ORIENTED BOARD REMEDY SHORT-TERMISM?
Our analysis has highlighted how shareholders may want to induce managerial short-termism as
a way of increasing the value of the option to resell to more optimistic shareholders at t = 1.
A natural question then arises whether long-term-oriented shareholders could remedy this short-
termism in ﬁrms.
We shall argue in this section that even long-term-oriented boards may want to exploit spec-
ulative episodes in stock markets. The main reason is that during such episodes the cost of capital
is below the ﬁrm’s long-run value, so that incumbent shareholders beneﬁt by raising capital26 (see
Stein, 1996; Baker et al., 2003).
While it is straightforward to see that equity raised at t = 0 is more undervalued relative
to long-run value, e, the higher is the speculative option value, it is less clear how the ﬁrm will
use the additional funds raised from the market. These funds could be used to raise dividend pay
outs or for investment. During the technology bubble, for example, most of the funds raised by
telecommunication ﬁrms were spent in additional investments. In our model, however, the scale
of the ﬁrm is ﬁxed. Thus, to keep the model as simple as possible, we shall only allow the ﬁrm
to use the new funds raised from equity markets to make higher dividend payments.
Speciﬁcally, we modify our model in this section to allow for equity issuance at t = 1. We
shall assume that incumbent shareholders own one share at t = 0, and may choose to issue an
additional q −1 shares at t = 1, bringing the total number of shares to q,( q ≥ 1). For simplicity,
we treat q as an exogenous parameter. The proceeds from this issue are then paid out as dividends
to incumbent shareholders. This simple extension of our model captures in a stark way how even
buy-and-hold investors may beneﬁt from exploiting speculative episodes.































which is the same as before.
26. We thank an anonymous referee for this insight.
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The value of a share at t = 0 to a buy-and-hold investor, who commits to hold his shares to






where the ﬁrst term represents the liquidation value of holding the share to t = 2, and the second
term represents the dividend obtained from issuing an additional (q −1) shares. Substituting in












Thus, the value of shares for a buy-and-hold investor will also depend on the short-term





Then, the long-term investor’s objective function can be written as a weighted average of the











be issued at t = 1. The next proposition provides a sufﬁcient condition under which the manager
engages in short-termist behaviour even when initial shareholders commit to hold their shares to
the ﬁnal liquidation.
Proposition 8. Let (α†,β†,δ†) be the optimal contract given an efﬁcient market, as speci-
ﬁed in Proposition 1. If the speculative coefﬁcient K and the number of shares to be issued q −1
are sufﬁciently large such that









then the resulting optimal managerial contract (α,β,δ) chosen by a long-term-oriented board
would still generate some short-termist behaviour: ω>0.
Proof. See Appendix A.  
Proposition 8 shows that in a speculative market, even a long-term-oriented board, which
represents shareholders who commit to hold their shares for the long term, might want to adopt
a managerial contract to motivate some short-termist effort from the manager. Admittedly, it
takes a larger speculative coefﬁcient K before a short-termist behaviour becomes attractive. The
numerical results reported in Appendix B further illustrate that the more shares the ﬁrm can issue
at t = 1, the more short-termist the manager’s incentives are and the more attention the manager
devotes to the castle-in-the-air project.27
27. Although our model assumes that the manager is rational, we also note that stock-based compensation could
provide a cheaper way to compensate the manager if he/she is overly optimistic about the ﬁrm’s prospects. In fact,
Bergman and Jenter (2003) provide evidence that ﬁrms grant more equity-based compensation to executives and employ-
ees in lower ranks when they hold exuberant sentiments about the future prospect of their ﬁrm. In such a case, reducing
compensation cost provides another argument for a long-term board to use equity-based compensation even if it induces
short-termist behaviour.
c   2006 The Review of Economic Studies LimitedBOLTON ET AL. COMPENSATION AND SHORT-TERM BEHAVIOUR 597
The analysis in this section, thus, suggests that if the objective is to reduce the incidence
of short-term speculative investments, then one way to achieve this is to have a more long-term-
oriented board, and to give more control to buy-and-hold investors. However, such a move can
only partially reduce short-termism.
6. DISCUSSION
6.1. Governance failure vs. speculative markets
Our analysis has implications for corporate governance and the regulation of CEO stock-option
plans. Reacting to the recent corporate scandals, many commentators (most notably, Bebchuk
et al., 2002) have argued that the current structure of CEO pay in the U.S. cannot be rational-
ized on the basis of agency theory. These commentators argue that the main problem with CEO
compensation in the U.S. is a failure of corporate governance and call for a regulatory response
to strengthen boards of directors, as well as audit and remuneration committees. Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001) propose a similar skimming view of CEO pay, in which CEOs capture the
pay-setting process, and analyse the hypothesis that ﬁrms with weaker governance tend to grant
more pay for luck. They ﬁnd some corroborating evidence in the oil industry.
Although the rent extraction and skimming view is consistent with the trend of quickly
growing executive compensation in the 1990s, it does not square well with other trends over the
1990s towards greater board independence, a higher proportion of externally recruited CEOs, a
decrease in the average tenure of CEOs, and higher forced CEO turnover, as Hermalin (2005) has
pointed out. Our view is that to reconcile all these trends, the missing link lies in the booming
stock markets over the 1990s, which ended with a spectacular bubble in high-tech stocks.
Our model highlights the tension between current shareholders and future investors. When
it is possible for future investors to overvalue the ﬁrm due to their optimism, it is in the interest
of current shareholders to cater to such potential sentiment even at the expense of ﬁrm long-
term fundamental value. If, as we propose, the explanation for the corporate failures is related to
speculative stock markets, and if the recent CEO compensation excesses are a by-product of the
technology bubble, then different policy implications would emerge. Thus, for example, further
strengthening of boards may not make a major difference. On the other hand, regulatory limits
on CEOs’ or controlling shareholders’ ability to unwind their own stock holdings early (whether
desirable or not) would provide a more effective deterrent to the pursuit of short-term strategies.
The performance of projects backed by VCs provides a natural experiment to isolate the
effects of speculative markets from that of governance failures. VCs are active monitors of
the ﬁrms that they ﬁnance, directly involved in project selection and managerial compensation.
Therefore, it is difﬁcult to argue that there could be any governance failure in VC-ﬁnanced ﬁrms.
It is also important to recognize that VCs’ horizon is usually no longer than the ﬁrm’s initial
public offering (IPO). In this sense, VCs’ objective is to maximize the market value of their
ventures at the time of the IPO, rather than the long-run value of ﬁrms.
Hendershott (2003) provides an analysis of the performance of 435 venture-backed dot-com
ﬁrms during the Internet boom. According to his study, VCs dramatically increased their invest-
ment in Internet projects in 1997 and 1998, and they successfully sold about half of them through
either public offerings or direct sales at more than three times their initial investment. However,
the longer term performance of these projects has been dreadful—the annualized returns by the
end of 2000 were −42% and −52% for the projects ﬁnanced initially in 1997 and 1998, and only
10% of these can be counted as long-term successes (worth at least 1·5 times the initial invest-
ment). Overall, the dismal performance of VC-backed Internet projects during the latter period
of the Internet boom provides a vivid example of ﬁrms pursuing value-destructive projects in
response to a speculative market.
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In general, the rent extraction view and our speculative market explanation provide distinct
implications on when ﬁrms are likely to do poorly. While the rent extraction view implies that
corporate failures are more likely to occur in ﬁrms with weak governance structures, irrespective
of market conditions, our view points in a different direction. We expect short-termist behaviour
to lead to corporate failures following speculative episodes, irrespective of whether ﬁrms have
good or bad governance. In particular, we expect failures to be more likely in new industries
where it is harder to evaluate the fundamental proﬁtability of a ﬁrm and consequently where
there is more likely to be substantial disagreement among investors. In terms of our model, ﬁrms
in such industries would have a high l parameter, and a low precision τ.
6.2. Empirical implications
Our model establishes a direct link between the investment horizons of shareholders and the
CEO. In a speculative stock market, incumbent shareholders have a shorter horizon and align the
manager’s horizon to theirs by weighing the CEO’s compensation more heavily on short-term
stock price performance. Our analysis, thus, echoes the observation by Froot et al. (1992) that
the average 1-year holding period of institutional investors in stocks might be too short for them
to exercise long-term discipline on ﬁrms.
In practice, a signiﬁcant fraction of shares are held by institutions. To the extent that insti-
tutions have a say in the design of executive compensation contracts, our model would predict
a positive correlation between institutional shareholder turnover and the ﬁrm manager’s short-
termist behaviour. Interestingly, Bushee (1998) ﬁnds supporting evidence of such a relation. He
shows that managers in ﬁrms where a large proportion of institutional owners have a high port-
folio turnover tend to reduce R&D expenses to boost short-term earnings.
To draw further empirical implications of our analysis, it is helpful to distinguish between
a weak and a strong form of our theory, based on the awareness of the contracting parties of
the existence of a speculative bubble. Under the weak form, the contracting parties design the
executivecompensationcontractbasedontheassumptionthatmarketsareefﬁcient, asweanalyse
in Section 4. Given such a contract, the CEO will still choose to pursue a short-term strategy
when a bubble actually arises, as in Proposition 4. Earnings manipulation by ﬁrms is a clear
example of short-termist behaviour. Several recent empirical studies, for example, Bergstresser
and Philippon (2002) and Peng and Roell (2003), report the link between earnings manipulation
and stock-based compensation to ﬁrm executives and ﬁnd supporting evidence that stock-based
compensation provides incentives for executives to manipulate earnings.
The strong form of our theory is that the contracting parties are aware at least partially
about possible market speculation and design managerial compensation contracts partly to induce
CEOs to exploit future investors. More speciﬁcally, the strong form would imply that, as the
market becomes more speculative, the compensation contract puts more weight on short-term
stock price performance (a shorter vesting period). There have been few if any empirical studies
that have explicitly focused on variations of investing periods.
There is some evidence conﬁrming the importance of the conﬂict between current and future
shareholders. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) show that many ﬁrms engage in earnings manipula-
tion right before their IPOs. They use abnormal discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings
manipulation and show that ﬁrms in the most aggressive earnings management quartiles under-
perform compared with those in the least aggressive quartiles by 20% in the 3 years following
the IPO. It is easy to understand the incentive of ﬁrm owners or shareholders of ﬁrms before
the IPOs, that is to sell the ﬁrm for a higher price. The effectiveness of earnings manipulation
in boosting IPO prices and the widespread use of such practices clearly supports our view that
current shareholders did engage in short-term strategies that aim to exploit future investors.
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TherecentsurveybyGrahametal.(2005)ofover400ﬁnancialexecutivesontheirdecisions
relating to ﬁnancial reporting provides further support for our analysis. They ﬁnd that executives
put great emphasis on meeting or beating short-term earnings benchmarks or forecasts, since
earnings announcements critically affect the stock price. To this end, 80% of respondents re-
port that they would be prepared to decrease discretionary spending on R&D, advertising, and
maintenance to meet earnings targets. More disconcertingly, more than half the respondents state
that they would be willing to burn “real” cash ﬂows by, say, delaying new projects and capital
expenditures for the sake of reporting expected accounting numbers. Some participants even ex-
plicitly point out in interviews that there is a constant tension between short-term and long-term
objectives of ﬁrms. These survey results again are consistent with our theory that ﬁrm execu-
tives are spurred by speculation in stock markets to take on short-term actions, such as earnings
manipulation and delaying proﬁtable real investments, to boost short-term stock prices.28
6.3. Equity overvaluation and value-destroying investments
The tension between current and future shareholders can cause great damage to ﬁrms especially
if it gives rise to overinvestment in a bubble market. Jensen (2004) and Jensen and Murphy
(2004) also emphasize the risk of overinvestment when equity is overvalued. Without pointing to
a speciﬁc mechanism, Jensen (2004) remarks:
the recent dramatic increase in corporate scandals and value destruction is due to what I call the
agency costs of overvalued equity. I believe these costs have amounted to hundreds of billions of
dollars in recent years. When a ﬁrm’s equity becomes substantially overvalued it sets in motion a
set of organizational forces that are extremely difﬁcult to manage, forces that almost inevitably lead
to destruction of part or all of the core value of the ﬁrm.
Our model provides a mechanism through which speculative stock markets lead ﬁrms to
overinvest in inefﬁcient projects. Our mechanism is consistent with several recent empirical stud-
ies on this issue. In particular, Polk and Sapienza (2003) ﬁnd a positive relation between ﬁrms’
overinvestment and a number of proxies for mispricing of their stocks, such as discretionary
accruals and price momentum. They also show that investment is more sensitive to mispricing
proxies for ﬁrms with higher R&D intensity and share turnover. Both variables, as shown in our
model, are positively related to speculative prices. Gilchrist et al. (2005) also ﬁnd that ﬁrms’
investment increases with the variance of analysts’ earnings forecasts, a proxy for the dispersion
of investor beliefs—the crucial force that drives speculative prices in our model.
Jensen and Murphy (2004) argue that ﬁnancial markets cannot easily correct this overval-
uation problem. While the market for corporate control could solve many of the problems of
undervalued equity in the 1970s and 1980s through hostile takeovers, leveraged buy-outs, and
management buy-outs, it could not solve the problem associated with equity overvaluation, as
no one can expect to make a proﬁt by buying an overvalued ﬁrm and then eliminating the
overvaluation.29
To resolve the agency cost associated with overvalued equity, our model suggests that
it is helpful to have a long-term-oriented board, which will be less inclined to approve a
28. Of course, other theories of short-termism based on asymmetric information and signal jamming (Stein, 1989;
Von Thadden, 1995) can also explain why managers would engage in earnings manipulation, but they would have greater
difﬁculty explaining how such manipulation generates short-term price hikes and why manipulation should vary posi-
tively with secondary-market trading.
29. The market could in theory solve this overvaluation problem if investors were more willing and able to short
overvalued stocks. But there are fundamental reasons why many individual investors and institutions such as mutual funds
and pension funds do not short stocks. One obvious reason being that a short position may involve unbounded losses.
It is, however, possible to intervene at the margin and make shorting somewhat easier, by, for example, eliminating the
uptick rule (an SEC rule stating that a short sale can only be executed on an “uptick” or a zero plus tick).
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compensation package that encourages short-termist strategies. Conceivably, an even more
effective policy intervention might be to impose restrictions on minimum vesting periods of
executives’ stock holdings. Such a policy could signiﬁcantly weaken a simple instrument that
speculative shareholders can currently use.
Our model also lends support to policy proposal that calls for more monitoring by the board
and audit committees of ﬁrms’ reporting policies. Better disclosure from a ﬁrm can make it
less likely that differences in investors’ beliefs arise. This is analogous to decreasing the value
of parameter l, which, as we show in Appendix B, makes the equilibrium less speculative and
therefore managers less likely to pursue short-termist strategies.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we used an optimal contracting or agency approach to explain the structure of CEO
compensation, making only one substantive change to the standard theory. Instead of modelling
stock markets as efﬁcient, we have allowed for heterogeneous beliefs by investors and conse-
quently speculative deviations of stock prices from fundamentals. We have shown how the intro-
duction of a speculative component in the stock price creates a distortion in CEO compensation
leading to a short-term orientation. For some parameter values, CEOs are encouraged to pursue
short-term speculative projects even at the expense of long-term fundamental value. In contrast
to the short-termism analysed in the previous literature, this type of managerial short-termism
is directly driven by the speculative motive of ﬁrms’ controlling shareholders. It is a form of
endogenous short-termism driven by differences of opinion. Our theory provides a perspective
for the recent corporate crisis which is different from that of the popular “rent extraction view”
of executive compensation. Where the rent extraction view calls for a wholesale strengthening
of boards, our model instead calls for a more speciﬁc intervention in the direction of a more
long-term orientation of boards.
APPENDIX A. SOME PROOFS
Proof to Proposition 1.
We denote x =µ/h = ατs
τs+τ +β. Note that 0≤ x ≤1. For a given level of x, investors can determine the combination






subject to the constraint that
0 ≤ β ≤ 1, 0 ≤ α ≤ (1−β).
It is immediate to establish the following results: if x < τs+τε
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Next, we determine the optimal level of x.I fx < τs+τε
τ+τs+τε , the objective of the shareholders can be derived as
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which is less than τs+τε
τ+τs+τε if h2 ≤ γ(τ+τs +τε)/τ2.
On the other hand, if x ≥ τs+τε
τ+τs+τε , the objective function can be derived as













and its maximum is reached at
x =
h2τ2τε +γτs(τ +τs +τε)
h2τ2τε +γ(τ+τs +τε)(τ +τs)
which is larger than τs+τε
τ+τs+τε if h2 >γ( τ+τs +τε)/τ2.  
Proof to Lemma 3.
The manager’s expected monetary compensation is
EA










And the variance of the manager’s pay-off is
Var A















































where   is given in equation (17). The ﬁrst variance is straightforward to derive. To derive the second one, it is important
to note that from the manager’s perspective (who shares the belief of group-A investors), z and εθ are independent with
variances of l2 and ηl2/φA, respectively. The following lemma can be used directly to derive this variance.  


































where a1 and a2 are two positive constants.
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Without loss of generality, we assume a1 < a2.I fa1(x + y)>a2(x + y), then x < −y. Therefore,












































where the last equation is calculated from direct expansion. Similarly, we can calculate the mean by









Using the previous two equations, we can calculate the variance as given in equation (A.1).  
Proof to Proposition 4.









































= αKl−(µ+ω)−γ l2ω+λ2 = 0.
Solving these ﬁrst-order conditions under the constraints above, we can directly get the three cases given in the
proposition.  
Proof to Proposition 6.




















,µ = 0,ω = αKl.
This is just a simpliﬁed version of Proposition 4 with γ = 0.
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It is easy to see that the maximum is reached at ατs
τs+τ +β = 1, which is only feasible with α = 0 and β = 1. With this
contract, the value of the objective function is h2
































It is easy to see that the maximum of K2l2
2 is reached at α = 1 and β = 0. This contract only satisﬁes the condition of the
case, αKl≥ h( ατs
τs+τ +β), when Kl≥ hτs
τs+τ .
By summarizing these two cases, we have the following optimal contract for a risk-neutral manager: if Kl ≥ h,
α = 1 and β = 0, otherwise, α = 0 and β = 1.  
Proof to Proposition 7.
Forthegivencontract, (α†,β†,δ†), wedenotethemanager’soptimaleffortchoiceinanefﬁcientmarketby(ω†,µ†).












implies that the manager’s optimal effort choice (ω,µ) contains a non-zero short-term effort: ω>0. Actually, depending
on the exact magnitude of K, there might be two cases: the short-termist case and the purely speculative case. It is
important to note that, in both cases, the manager’s short-term effort would also beneﬁt the incumbent shareholders,
whose objective function is given in equation (18).










, it is easy to verify that µ+
ω = µ†. Then, the manager’s objective function under the new effort choice becomes larger:
(1−α† −β†)(hµ+ Klω)+δ† = (1−α† −β†)hµ† +δ† +(1−α† −β†)(Kl−h)ω
≥ (1−α† −β†)hµ† +δ†.





, it is also direct to verify that
ω =
α†Kl







Thus, the incumbent shareholders’ objective function is also increased:
(1−α† −β†)Klω† +δ† >( 1−α† −β†)Klµ† +δ† >( 1−α† −β†)hµ† +δ†.
In summary, under the conditions in (20), the manager’s short-term effort choice improves the welfare of him-
self/herself and the incumbent shareholders for the optimal contract in an efﬁcient market in which short-termist be-
haviour is not rewarded. Therefore, the equilibrium contract in the new speculative environment must also motivate some
short-term effort from the manager.  
Proof to Proposition 8.
Our plan for the proof is to show that, for the given contract (α†,β†,δ†), the combined welfare of the shareholders,
asgivenin(22), andtheCEOcanbeincreasedinaspeculativemarketundertheconditionsin(23)fromthecorresponding
level in an efﬁcient market. The gain comes from allowing the manager to sell early to an overvalued stock market, and
both shareholders and the manager can beneﬁt by splitting the gain.
Forthegivencontract, (α†,β†,δ†), wedenotethemanager’soptimaleffortchoiceinanefﬁcientmarketby(ω†,µ†).





from Proposition 1. The welfare of the shareholders is
L†
shareholders = (1−α† −β†)hµ† −δ,
the welfare of the manager is
L†
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and the sum is
L†
shareholders +L†





















In a speculative market under the condition that α†Kl > h, Proposition 4 indicates that the manager will choose
some short-term effort with the contract (α†,β†,δ†). We denote the manager’s effort choice by (ω‡,µ‡), which is given
in Proposition 4 according to two different cases. The shareholders’ welfare is
L‡
shareholders = (1−α† −β†)hµ‡ +[(1−λ)(1−α† −β†)−λα†]Klω‡ −δ,
the manager’s welfare is
L‡

























and the sum is
L‡
shareholders +L‡











































, that is, the speculative case in Proposition 4, we have ω‡ =
α†Kl
















































































In the short-termist case given by Proposition 4, it is direct to verify that
ω‡ +µ‡ = µ†,
and thus
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FIGURE 1
























APPENDIX B. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS WITH A RISK-AVERSE CEO
In this appendix, we provide a series of numerical examples to illustrate the optimal contract and managerial actions
when the CEO is risk averse. The numerical solutions reported have been obtained using a standard MATLAB routine.
To contrast the numerical solutions with Proposition 7, we continue to assume that φA = 1 and begin by discussing how
the CEO’s risk aversion affects the optimal contract and equilibrium actions.
B.1. CEO risk aversion γ
When secondary markets are efﬁcient, the optimal contract puts positive weight on both short-term and long-term per-
formances since both are informative about the agent’s action choice. In addition, exposure to both types of risk provides
diversiﬁcation beneﬁts to the CEO. In the presence of speculative distortions, we expect that the optimal contract will put
more weight on short-term performance, but otherwise continues to base compensation on both short- and long-term per-
formances. As the CEO becomes more risk averse, we expect that there will be greater beneﬁts to diversiﬁcation and that
therefore there will be a more balanced weighting on both performance measures. For high coefﬁcients of risk aversion,
we expect the manager to put more weight on the less risky long-term value of the ﬁrm.
These predictions are generally borne out by our numerical solutions. However, these solutions also highlight the
subtle effects of risk aversion on short-termist speculative incentives. We provide one illustration in Figure 1 for an
intermediate value of φB.30
This ﬁgure reveals the somewhat surprising ﬁnding that the manager is induced to focus exclusively on the short-
term project both when his/her coefﬁcient of risk aversion is very small (less than 0·1 in the illustrated example) and when
it is very large (above 1·3 in our example). When the manager’s risk aversion increases above 0·1 but remains less than
1·3, he/she switches to pursuing only the ﬁrm’s fundamental value but his/her compensation is based on a combination
of long-term and short-term stock performance. Finally, when the managers’s coefﬁcient of risk aversion γ increases
beyond 1·3, he/she switches back to pursuing only the short-term speculative project and his/her compensation is again
30. In a previous version, we also report solutions for high and low values of φ.
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FIGURE 2
Optimal contract and actions as a function of φB
only based on the ﬁrm’s short-term performance. The ﬁgure provides some clues to the reasons for this non-monotonic
pattern. When the manager’s coefﬁcient of risk aversion increases, it becomes more and more expensive for shareholders
to induce him/her to pursue the long-term value of the ﬁrm. Therefore, in equilibrium, the manager scales back his/her
effort and chooses lower µ. At some point, the overall beneﬁt of pursuing the long-term value in this way is so small that
shareholders prefer to switch to the speculative strategy. This explains the non-monotonic relation between γ and (µ,ω).
This ﬁgure illustrates the complex interaction between several effects and the difﬁculties in characterizing a complete
analytical solution for the optimal contract.
B.2. “Overconﬁdence” parameter φB
It is natural to expect that the optimal contract will put more weight on short-run performance, the higher the overcon-
ﬁdence of group-B investors φB. More precisely, as φB becomes larger, posterior beliefs between the two groups of
investors at t = 1 become more dispersed. Therefore, the speculative component in stock prices, or the value of the resale
option, becomes larger. This should encourage shareholders to take a more short-termist outlook. Similarly, we expect
shareholders to give the CEO a more short-term-weighted compensation contract, which will induce his/her to put more
effort into the castle-in-the-air project (a higher ω). Figure 2 shows how the optimal contract and optimal actions vary
with φB. When φB is small, the optimal contract puts weights on short- and long-term performance. The optimal contract
is close to the equilibrium contract obtained in the standard case (φB = 1). For high φB, on the other hand, the optimal
contract only uses short-term stock participation, as expected.
B.3. The manager’s return on effort h and l
The comparative statics results with respect to marginal return on effort on the fundamental project are as one would
expect. The higher is h, the higher will be the equilibrium effort µ. This can be seen clearly in Figure 3.
Similarly, when the manager’s effort on the castle-in-the-air project is more effective in terms of generating specu-
lative price component (as measured by l), shareholders induce the manager to put more effort in that project, provided
that group-B investors disagree sufﬁciently with group-A investors. This is illustrated in Figure 4 for φB = 2.
B.4. Fundamental risk τ, τs, and τε
Given a ﬁxed compensation contract {α,β,δ}, the CEO is likely to increase his/her effort µ when the precisions τ,τs, and
τε increase, since investment in the long-term project exposes him/her to less risk. In other words, the cost to shareholders
ofinducingtheCEOtosupplyagivenlevelofeffort µisreducedastheseprecisionsincrease.Therefore, wewouldexpect
shareholders to “buy” more effort from the CEO, which means that α+β should increase. Figure 5 illustrates this point.
This ﬁgure also shows that µ increases with τ. This is natural, since for a small value of τ, the long-term project is very
risky, and hence the optimal contract induces the manager to focus on the short-term project. For higher values of τ, the
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FIGURE 3
Optimal contract and actions as a function of h
FIGURE 4
Optimal contract and actions as a function of l
underlying risk on u is reduced and the manager is induced to switch to pursuing the long-term fundamental value of
the ﬁrm. But the contract still provides for some diversiﬁcation of risk by putting positive weight on both short-term and
long-term performance.31
B.5. Share issuance q
Figure 6 shows that as a long-term-oriented board needs to issue more shares at t = 1 (bigger q), the optimal contract
shifts more weight to short-term stock participation through α and consequently the CEO will put more effort to the
castle-in-the-air project.
31. In an earlier version, we showed that the comparative statics with respect to τs and τε are similar to those with
respect to τ.
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FIGURE 5
Optimal contract and actions as a function of τ
FIGURE 6
Optimal contract and actions as a function of q
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